

AFFIDAVIT OF THE WITNESS

FRITZ VON PETERSDORF

Moscow, May 12, 1947.

Colonel Rosenblit, assistant Soviet prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East interrogated through an interpreter captain Gerasimova as a witness Fritz Petersdorf, prisoner of war, member of the former German army.

Question: Your name?

Answer: Fritz von Petersdorf.

Q: Your age?

A: 47.

Q: Your last rank?

A: Lieutenant-colonel.

Q: Are you a prisoner of war?

A: Yes, I am.

Q: When and where were you taken prisoner?

A: In 1945 south of Berlin.

Q: What was your post in the German army?

A: I was assigned to the headquarters of an infantry division.

Q: Where is your domicile at present?

A: POW Camp No. 27.

Q: Have any charges been brought against you by Soviet prosecuting or judiciary authorities?

A: No, no charges have been brought against me.

- - - - -

The witness is warned that he must tell the truth and nothing but the truth. He is also warned that he bears criminal responsibility for false testimony under article 95 of the criminal code of the R.S.F.S.R. (The Russian Soviet Federative Soviet Republic).

The interpreter captain Gerasimova is warned of the responsibility for a deliberately wrong translation and secretary - stenographer Kubeeva of the responsibility for a deliberately wrong recording of the interrogation.

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The certificates of the witness von Petersdorf, interpreter captain T. Pusimova and secretary - stenographer Kubeeva are attached to the minutes of the interrogation.

Q: When where you in Japan?
A: From September 1938 to January 1943.

Q: What official posts did you hold in Japan?
A: At first I was language - trainee officer and from December 1938 to December 1942 assistant military attaché of the German Embassy in Tokyo.

Q: Who was your predecessor in the post of the assistant military attaché?
A: Major, later lieutenant-colonel, Schol.

Q: Who was your successor in that post?
A: Colonel Niemeler, I believe.

Q: Who was your chief?
A: Colonel Mazki before December 1940 and colonel, later major - general Krechmer, after that date.

Q: With what officers of the Japanese General Staff are you personally acquainted.
A: With lieutenant - colonel Saigo, major Kandori, lieutenant - colonel Yamagata, lieutenant - colonel Akita, general Sugiyama Gen, major - general Okamoto and Prince Kanin.

Q: What post did those officers hold?
A: Prince Kanin and general Sugiyama were chiefs of the Army General Staff; major - general Okamoto - chief of one of the divisions of the General Staff; lieutenant - colonel Saigo and lieutenant - colonel Yamagata - chiefs of the German division of the Japanese General Staff; major Kandori and lieutenant - colonel Akita worked in the German division of the Japanese General Staff.

Q: Were you personally acquainted with general Tojo?
A: Yes, I was.

Q: When and under what circumstances did you make his acquaintance?
A: I made his acquaintance in November 1938 during an outing on horseback in the outskirts of Tokyo which was arranged for foreign military attaches and their assistants on the occasion of the conclusion of the anti-comintern pact.

Q: What post did Tojo hold then?
A: I do not know exactly, but I believe that he was commander of the army air force.

Q: How many times did you meet Tojo?
A: I met him several times at official receptions.

Q: When did you see general Tojo last?
A: On January 1, 1943 when I paid him a farewell visit.

Q: Are you acquainted with general Oshima?
A: Yes, I am.

Q: When did you make his acquaintance?
A: I made his acquaintance as far back as the Olympic in Berlin in 1936.

Q: Did you meet him in Japan?
A: Yes, I did.

Q: When did you meet him in Japan?
A: Only once in May 1939, 1940 or 1941. I do not remember the year exactly, but I remember well that it was in May at the farewell dinner given by Oshima at the restaurant "Hoshiga Oka".

Q: Were you acquainted with general Muto Akira?
A: Yes, I was.

Q: When and where did you make his acquaintance?
A: I made his acquaintance and met him several times in the house of the military attache and at the minister's.

Q: What was Muto Akira's position then?
A: He was chief of the military - political department of the Japanese War Ministry.

Q: Why do you call this department military - political?
A: That is how our translators translated the name of that department.

Q: Did you read any official Japanese documents containing military plans of Japan against the Soviet Union?
A: No, I did not read any official documents, but I heard about it during the confidential conversation of the German Ambassador Ott with general Tojo.

Q: Tell in detail about that conversation. When did it take place, on what occasion and what was the subject of the conversation?
A: It was in the summer of 1942 in Juné or July when Tojo asked Ott to receive him for a confidential talk. Ott agreed and the conversation took place in Ott's office in the Embassy.

Ott, military attache Krechmer and I as an interpreter were present at this conversation from the German side. Prime Minister Tojo, two generals, whose names I do not remember, and captain Yamazaki who acted as an interpreter were present from the Japanese side. At

that time German troops were very successful in North Africa and the Japanese supposed that the German army would reach the Suez Canal. At the same time German troops were successfully advancing in the Caucasus.

Tojo said that German troops should advance as far as Aden and Basra and the Japanese to India and Ceylon via Burma and the border line of their sphere of interests would lie along 70° East.

Then Tojo said that the Anglo-Saxons should be driven out of East Asia and that all the sources of raw materials there would provide Germany with the raw materials necessary for her industry.

Then the conversation turned upon the Soviet Far East. I do not remember exactly whether Ott asked Tojo something or Tojo spoke about the Soviet Far East himself. Tojo said that Japan was a mortal enemy of Russia and that Vladivostok was a permanent threat to Japan from the flank and that in the course of that war there was an opportunity of removing that danger. He said that it was not so difficult to do that as there was an excellent Kwantung army which included the best troops. Tojo gave to understand that Japan intended to make a surprise attack on Vladivostok from land, sea and air at the same time carrying on a diversionary operation against Blagoveshensk. I heard the confirmation of that plan of attack on the U.S.S.R. at different times and under different circumstances from the interpreter Kogure, major Kandori and lieutenant - colonel Yamagata.

When in 1942 I visited Yamagata in the Japanese General Staff in reply to my question how the Japanese intended to attack the Soviet Union showed me in silence the Vladivostok and Blagoveshensk directions on the map.

Q: Was it discussed during the conference in Ott's office how far Japan intended to send its troops on the territory of the Soviet Union?

A: During that conversation Tojo gave to understand that it was not sufficient to occupy Vladivostok and Blagoveshensk and that it was necessary to extend the Japanese sphere of influence up to the lake Baikal.

Q: How long did the conference at Ott's office last?
A: About two hours.

Q: What was Ott's and Krechmer's view of the Japanese plan as expounded by Tojo?

A: They kept silence during the conference. During the conference it was Tojo who talked almost exclusively. I know from subsequent conversations with Krechmer that he was in a pessimistic mood. He thought that the Japanese were dispersing their forces. He hoped that a concentrated blow would be struck at the Far East, but not at India.

Q: What in your opinion was the object of Tojo's visit to Ott?
A: I think that Tojo wanted to know from the German ambassador and the military attache whether German troops would reach Aden and Basra at that time. Before launching the offensive Tojo wanted to ascertain if Germany was sufficiently sure of her successes. He wanted to find that out from Ott and the military attache.

Q: Tell about your meeting Oshima at a banquet in the restaurant "Hoshiga Oka".
A: Such dinners are given openly in Japanese restaurants and there are many outsiders. Therefore the Japanese never talk about serious matters during such dinners and all serious matters are discussed with the main guests before dinner. I recall Oshima raising his goblet and saying facetiously "for your Ural and for our lake Baikal", but I know that behind that facetious toast was his real opinion.

Q: How do you know that that was his real opinion?
A: Almost all the officers I talked with said that Oshima was the main representative of aggressive circles advocating an attack on the Soviet Union.

Q: Have you ever heard Muto express any political views?
A: No, I have never heard Muto express any such views as he was very reserved. But his officers said that he also belonged to the aggressive circles; it was intended even to make him the Minister of War due to his business ability.

Q: Did you receive information of military nature pertaining to the Soviet Union from the Japanese General Staff in 1941, 1942?
A: Yes, I did. I received that information from major Kandori and other officers of the German division of the General Staff.

Q: Tell in detail how often you received information and about what?
A: I received all military information about the Russian Far Eastern army, namely: disposition of troops, their strength, military transports, the details about the reserves, movements of Soviet troops at the European front as well as the data concerning the war industry in the Soviet Union.

Q: How often did you receive information about the military and economic position of the Soviet Union?
A: Prior to my leaving the post of assistant military attache I daily visited the Japanese General Staff in order to furnish them with information about the position on German fronts and if they had information for us from the Russian division it was furnished to me. At first that information was not received so often, but later on I received it twice or three times a week.

Q: What use was made of that information?
A: That information by means of a ciphering machine was transmitted to the attache department of the OKW in Berlin.

Q: Did you often transmit that information to Berlin?
A: That information was transmitted as soon as it was received, first rarely and later on oftener. Especially important pieces of information passed through the ciphering bureau of the Embassy.

Q: Were you in Manchuria?
A: Yes, I was.

Q: How many times were you in Manchuria?
A: Three times. First time I was in Manchuria with colonel Mazki from May 12 to July 1939. The second time I stayed there for a very short time in May or June 1940. The third time I was in Manchuria in February or in March 1941 also only for a few days when Krechmer was introduced to the Manchurian government he being concurrently the military attache in Manchuria as well.

Q: Are you aware of the strength of the Kwantung army in different periods?
A: Yes, I am.

Q: From what sources do you know that?
A: Partly from the Japanese General Staff, from the German correspondent Richard Zorge from whom we received exact data as to the number of Kwantung army divisions and some of their numbers. From the German mission in Manchuria we also received some data as to the strength of the Kwantung army.

Q: How did you estimate the strength of the Kwantung army as of the beginning of 1941 during your third visit to Manchuria.
A: Approximately 20-30 Japanese divisions.

Q: Do you mean the number of divisions or the number of troops necessary for forming 20-30 divisions?
A: The Japanese said that they had such a number of divisions, but I do not know whether each division was 10 or 20 thousand strong.

Q: In accordance with your observation did the Kwantung army strengthen or on the contrary become weaker after the outbreak of the German-Soviet war?
A: The Kwantung army became stronger in all respects: from the point of view of its personnel, their training, the construction of barracks as well as the construction of fortifications.

Q: Where did you obtain these data?
A: We obtained these data from the German mission in Chungking. Besides I personally received information from General Staff Officers,

particularly from major Kandori. Besides I knew that the Japanese divisions were sent not to China but to Manchuria. The Germans coming from Manchuria said that they had seen troop trains bound for Manchuria. The railway passenger traffic from Japan to Korea and Manchuria discontinued several times. All this was after the outbreak of the German Soviet war in 1941.

Q: What information had you about the strengthening of the Kwantung army during the summer of 1941? You said that at the beginning of 1941 there were 25-30 Japanese divisions. Did their number increase or decrease as of summer 1941?

A: The number of divisions, it seems, was not greatly increased, but the existing divisions were strengthened. Besides the Manchurian troops who existed along with the Japanese were better trained and organized than before. The Japanese officers and NCO's were in charge of that training.

Q: Do you know anything about the technical equipment of the Kwantung army in that period?

A: Major Kandori, for instance, told me that the grenade presented by Hitler to the Japanese General Staff was to be mainly used on the Manchurian place d'armes.

Q: Tell in detail about the grenade.

A: That was a hollow grenade of great piercing capacity which was to pierce the armor up to 8 centimeters thick.

Q: Under what circumstances did Hitler present the Japanese General Staff with that grenade?

A: In spring 1942 lieutenant - colonel Niemeler and captain Merkel, both from the Armament Department arrived in Tokyo on ships breaking through the blockade and brought with them a specimen of a hollow shell with drawings and designs. In a very solemn atmosphere that shell was turned over by them to the Chief of the Japanese General Staff as Hitler's present to the Japanese Emperor. After that Niemeler and Merkel worked in a special Bureau with Japanese officers from the armament department in order to arrange the serial production of that shell in Japan.

Q: How do you know that?

A: I learned about that from the conversations of the military attache with Niemeler during which I was present. Besides I personally received for decoding some telegrams addressed to Niemeler from which his mission in Japan was clear.

Q: Do you know colonel Kaila, the Finnish military attache?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: What do you know about his activity in Manchuria?
A: Colonel Kaila in the autumn of 1942 visited Manchuria at the invitation of the Kwantung army in order to make them familiar with warfare in winter conditions.

Q: How do you know that?
A: I was present when colonel Kaila paid a farewell visit to the military attache Krechmer before going to Manchuria and spoke just about that.

Q: Did you see colonel Kaila after his return from Manchuria?
A: I do not recall that exactly. I may have seen him as he returned from Manchuria to Tokyo before my departure to Germany.

Q: Do you know the results of colonel Kaila's trip to Manchuria?
A: Krechmer told me about the results of that trip. Colonel Kaila told him that he was pleased with the results of his visit and thought that he had instructed the Japanese army well about the conduct of military operations in winter conditions and that his instructions were of value for the Japanese army.

Q: You said that you saw Tojo during your farewell visit to him on January 1, 1943. Describe that visit.
A: I saw Tojo in his office on account of his invitation of all foreign attaches and their assistants to attend the new year's festival of 1943.

Q: Did Tojo say anything during your visit about the plans of Japan as regards the Soviet Union?
A: No, he did not. Tojo only said that Japan would support Germany with different raw materials at her disposal from the occupied areas. As to Germany she had to provide the transport for exporting all those raw materials.

Q: Were any raw materials exported during the war from Japan to Germany?
A: Yes, many raw materials were exported on German ships breaking the blockade.

Q: From whom do you know about that?
A: From admiral Weneker, German naval attache, and also because in January 1943 I was going to Germany on one of the ships breaking the blockade.

Q: What was the name of that transport and what raw and other materials did it carry?
A: It was an Italian ship "Pietro Orseolo". She carried over 1000 tons of rubber, 1000 tons of tin and 100-200 tons of tea.

Q: Where were rubber, tin and tea taken on board?
A: They were taken on board in Singapore.

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The minutes of interrogation were read to me in German, which is my mother tongue.

The record is true and correct which I certify with my signature.

Witness (signed: Petersdorf)

Interrogated: Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the
International Military Tribunal for the
Far East.

Colonel (Rosenblit)

Interpreter captain (Gerasimova)

Secretary-stenographer (Kubeeva)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, the undersigned stenographer N.D. Kubeeva, give this certificate to colonel Rosenblit, Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and pledge myself to record correctly the interpreted testimony given by Fritz von Petersdorf relating to the case of major Japanese war criminals.

I have been warned that for a deliberately false recording I bear criminal responsibility under article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(Kubeeva)

May 12, 1947

The certificate was given to me.

Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Colonel (Rosenblit)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, the undersigned interpreter captain L.I. Gerasimova, give this certificate to colonel Rosenblit, Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and pledge myself to interpret correctly the testimony given by Fritz von Petersdorf relating to the case of major Japanese war criminals.

I have been warned that for a deliberately false interpretation I bear criminal responsibility under article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(L. Gerasimova)

May 12, 1947

The certificate was given to me.

Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Colonel (Rosenblit)

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, the undersigned Fritz von Petersdorf, give this certificate to colonel Rosenblit, Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and pledge myself to give true and correct testimony relating to the case of major Japanese war criminals.

I have been warned that for giving false testimony I bear criminal responsibility under article 95 of the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R.

(Fritz von Petersdorf)

May 12, 1947.

The certificate was given to me.

Assistant Soviet Prosecutor of the
International Military Tribunal for
the Far East.

Colonel (Rosenblit)

Interpreter - captain Gerasimova

卷之三

「大正」三月廿四日、御前閣外事務局、監察部、法務司、司法司
大佐、通譯、少佐、大尉參加、下士、書人
上訴、軍事停審前然遂、軍事不一、
上野、川口、許門等。

جی ۴ / ۳ Doc

答曰：姓名，字，三十人。

丁巳夏，歸自京師，賦此以紀之。

四三

1 + 2 = 3 (one from each) $\frac{1}{2}$

2012

一九四五年六月、白杯カラ酒造アス

丁巳年正月廿二日
丁巳年正月廿二日

アカツ八時行ノ吉多一郎乃
二郎

11. 10. 80

和威少將軍，即司令部，附于二

現在アラハ行所二層リ又

属中等种，故前半叶长

軍事停廢狀之合計者二十二事

（三）（三），（三）

問答

問答

少佐アタマ、夏後中佐アタマ、アリス
アタマ、後任トシテ詫ガシ、職在リミタク。
タタカニハ人詫テアタマ、思合ス。

アタマ、前任者トシテ詫ガシ、陸軍武官輔佐官
職在リミタク。

少佐アタマ、夏後中佐アタマ、アリス

アタマ、日本三佐多時如行小公職在リミタク。
最初和語学研究將校アリ。一九三八年十一月
一九四三年十二月迄、在東京總領事館附陸軍武官輔佐官

アタマ、前任者トシテ詫ガシ、陸軍武官輔佐官
職在リミタク。

Doc 3/45-

詫人ハ證言一ツヲ、謂之「事實」何事
之証言也ラク注意ヲ喚起シ、詫人ハ又應答、
証言ヲ與ル。又打手官事に於ケル、社會主義解釈
ソウエイ共和国刑法第十九条第二條ニ依リ刑法
之責任、實心セキサリトモテ、又注意ヲ喚起シタ
而証言之實心モ大尉ノ如クテ居テ正ニカラズ通
譯ノ事ニ付シテ許ム、又書記兼連記者ノ人
エリハ知テ居テカラ正ニカラサル証言記録ヲ承
ナキル。特ニ實心之注意ヲ喚起シタ、詫
人ノ事ニ付シテ、通訳ヲミセコロ大尉及
書記兼連記者ノ人エリ、証書ハ調書
一附屬セシマレアル。

答、一九四〇年十二月連合軍大佐、其後、大佐チ真後少将ニ
シテ、シナカルテアリス。

115 答、問、日本參謀本部、將校中、誰トアリ個人的知合チ者。
答、西郷中佐、カドリ少佐山ガタ中佐、秋田中佐杉山元將

軍、岡本少将及用院宮、知合ニテアリ。

116 答、問、アラム今言ハタ人、官職、言テ下さい。
答、用院宮ト杉山將軍、參謀總長テアリシテ、岡本少
將、參謀本部次長テアリシテ、西郷中佐及山ガタ中佐
ハ日本參謀本部總乙課長テアリシタカドリ少佐及秋

田中佐、日本參謀本部總乙課三勤務ミテ居ミシタ。

答、問、アラム個人的東條將軍ト知合テリミテ
公知合ニテアリ。

答、問、何時スドテ事情テアタ東條ト知合ニカリミタカ。

答、一九三八年十月東京郊外ニ於ケル某處散策際
知合ニカリミタカ、唯ニ防共協定締結、機会ミテアリ
外國陸軍武官及ソ、輔佐官メニサレタモテアリシテ。

答、問、當時東條、何デシタ。

答、確タニトハ言ニ善ニスガ當時彼人、航空機運

乃多ト思ニス。

答、問、東條ト何回會ニシタカ。

答、公私會合、度々數回云。

117 3 番、問、アラム東條將軍、會テ最後場合、何時云々。

118

90c 3/45

答、一九四三年一月一日私が彼所へ別れ、旅費二行ツ

叶テス

大島將軍ト知合テスカ

父ハ

何叶彼ト知合ニナリマシタカ

答、一九三六年中伯林デオリンビツアフツ時 既ニ知合

テシタ

日本デ彼ニ會ニミタカ

父會ニミシタ

何時彼ト日本デ會ニシタカ

答、一九三九年、一九四〇年、一九四年、五月、唯一回イチ、
年ハ正確ニ想ニ起シマセニ、然シソレハ五月、ニード星
ケ岡茶寮カガミザシヤ大島、ヤツタ送別會、席上デアツコト

ハ良、豐エテ居リマス

武藤章將軍ト知合ヒテスカ

父、彼ト知合ヒテシタ

何時何處デ彼ト知合ニナリマシタカ

陸軍武官邸ト公使、所デ知合ヒナリ數回會

ミシタ

當時武藤章ハ何職ニアリマシタカ

日本陸軍省軍事政治局、指導者

何故アナタハヨノ局ヲ軍事政治局ト呼ビマスカ

自分等前、日本人通訳達ミシタ局、日本名稱

ラ左様詎テ居リミタ

Aug 3145

۱۷۰

向、何が日本、何が戦争計畫の事か、詳述下さい。日本側、公式文書どう讀む場合がありますか。
答、イヤ、公式文書どう讀むか、ナシナシです。經
て、大使下東條外相軍、秘密會議時に
向、二月東條會議はいつ行なった場合
=又二月二十日詰シタカ詳シテ詰ニサレ
答、ソハ一九四三年六月廿一日、寅次二トテ東條が秋
密會議、松久会ツテ源太郎等申セタ叶
テアリミタ、廿二日之一同意にて會議、大使館
内オシテ、草稿室行なひテ、會議六
猶乙側ヨリモテ陸軍、武官ヲ代表及通
詣トテ私事立席シタ
日本側カハ東條首相、特使二名、以降今
想本志セ、外ニ山崎大臣が通詣トテ立席
居ヌメ、當時猶乙軍ハ北門ヲ大成功ヲ収メテ
居ヌメ、ソテ日本側、猶乙軍ガスエレ逢河
達也ト見タク、同叶、猶乙軍ハ成功シテ
カサニミシテ居テテ
東條ハシテ、即ち猶乙軍ハテニ及ハズ進
テ來ナラス、又日本側ハルニチ至テ印度及
ヨシニ行カシテナラス、ソテ彼等、利益圈、
機密ハ唐經六十度ニ及シテ、通ルテリス

Doc 3145

No 6

更ニ東條、即チヨーロ、ナクソニ人ハ東西
ヨリ駆逐セラハキテアリ、又此所ニ有ニ原物料
有ル產地ハ獨乙ニ對シテソノ工業用ト事
必要アル奉特ヲ供給スニテアリウト。
次ニ談話ハ極東ソ領國係ニ入りニテ、イント
カ何カ東條一員イタラアツタリ、若クハ東條
カ自身ダナテ極東ソ領、ニシテ語ニテ、クソ
真自合ハ正確ニ相ハニシテニト古事ニセニ、
東條ハニコニテ、既牛ハ「ヨミア」、奉奉、敵モ
又浦塙斯徳ハ日本ニトテ、上帝ニ側面カラ、脅脣
威トナテ居ル、又ニ戰爭進行中ニ在危險
ヲ除クタメ、前合ノヨイ機會ガアルノデアリト、彼又イ
ニシテ即チ三メヤルニト、格別困難テナイゾノタメ
六優秀ナ軍隊ヲ包倉ニテ、吾ル立派ナ國東
軍十ガアリ、東條ハ日本トニテ、突然一空海
陸、各方面ヨリ浦塙斯徳ニ対攻撃ヲ加ヘ同
叶ニ武市ニ計ニテ、奉利策、戰ヲ行フトニ居
ル、テアリニリト解ラ與ハニシテ、
色ミナ時ニ又環争事一情、下ニ私ハ小暮
ヲ通訳ガニトリ少佐及山グラ中佐クラソノ前
攻撃計画ヲ確立、語ヲ聞キニシテ山グラニ九
四二年中、或叶私が彼ヲ參謀本部ニ往訪
ニテ私カラ日本側ハ討ソ攻撃ヲトニテ風ニ対現
ニシテ、居ルカト實ネタ時、之ニ答ヘニテ

黙ッタ儘地因上デ浦塩ト武市トヘ、方角ヲ示ミシタコトアリス。

問. オット、事務室テ会談、叶日本ハド、位深ソノ領ヘシ、軍隊ヲ動クス種、テアリニシイテ、詔ガアリス。
答. 会談、叶東條ハ浦塩ヤ武市占領、丈ヶ谷不十分、テ日本、勢力圏ヲハイカル、湖辺拡張元必要ガアルトイウ了解ラ與ヘシタ。

問. オット、所、会談、ド、位長、續キシタカ。

問. 約二叶間、東條、ニウタ日本側計画ニライテオット及、乙ナメ

ガドニテ考ラレヘニシタ。

答. 会談、時彼等ハ黙ッテ居ニシタ、ニ、会談、テ殆ニト東條独リ詰ナシミシタ。其後、クレチルト、会談カラニテ私ハ彼が悲観的ニアツコトヲ承知シテ居リマス、彼ハ日本側が其、力ヲ浪費シテ居ルト考ヘタ、テス、彼ハ極東ニ村山隼木中の打撃ヲ期待シテ居タテアリテ印度ニ村シテ、テハナカラ、テアリユス。

向. アナ自身トニテハ東條、ナシト、訪向、趣旨ヲ

ニテ風ニア解ミシタ。

答. 自今、考ヘハ、東條ハ現在獨乙軍、ガアテニヤハスレ迄達ニ得ルト、クニシイテ、獨乙大使及陸軍武官カラ知リテイナシテ居ラモト思ニテス、東條ハ攻撃ヲ始メル前、獨乙が果ニテ自分

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成功二十分、自信がアルクドーフ確メタイト思ツテ居ミタ。
彼ハ之ヲオット及陸軍、武官、所テ明ニシタイト思バツテ居
ミタ。

問、星ガ岡茶寮、享會、席上アナタが大島ト会シタニト

ライテ話ミテ下サイ

答、日本料理店デヤル、斯種、会食ハ用放的モノ、テアリ又
關係ナヒ、聽手が多數居ル、故日本人ハミナ、会食、席上
（六）重要ナユトハ決シテ話サナ、重要ナ問題ハ、總テ会
食並主ル客トノ間ニ論議、サレミス、私ハ大島ガ酒杯ヲ擎
ゲテ冗談ニアタ、コウラル、タメニ、ソミテ我々ノハイケル湖ノウタ
トユウヨコトヲ、嘗ヘ居ミス、然シコノ冗談ノ乾杯、背後ニ彼
ノ眞ノ意、因ガ隠レ居タト承知ミテ居ミタ。

問、ドミテアナハソレが大島ノ眞ノ意見ダレタト承知ニミスカ

答、我々が話ニテニ、將校ハ殆ト全部大島ハ対ソ攻撃、且
張ニテ、侵略者方面主も代表者デルトエウテ居ミタ、
同、アタハ何時、武藤、何等の政治問題ニ關スル言明ヲ

答、武藤久松自身ソノ孫テ言明ヲ耳ニシタコトハ、全アリマ
セニ、トユハアノ人ハ非常ニ用心深カツタ、然ツミ彼將
校達、彼が天張リ侵略者一味ニ屢ニテ居トニウモ居
マシタ、彼ガ事務的ハ良タ、彼ヲ陸軍大臣ニ擬シタコト
スラアリマシタ。

問、一九四一、一九四二年中アナハ日本參謀本部クラソ前
答、關係、軍事情報ヲ受取りミタカ、
八、受取リミタ、私ハ日本參謀本部、独立課、カトリ、少
佐及其他、將校クラソ、情報ヲ受取リミタ。
カ詳テ話ミテ下さい。

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答、私ハ「口ニ？」極東軍關係、總子、軍事情報報即軍隊配置、ソ連、軍隊輸送、コト江蘇備運二ツイテ、詳細歐洲軍隊ソ軍移動、詳細江蘇ソ軍事工業三閥ノ資料を受取リテシ。

問、ソ聯、軍事及經濟狀況ニテ、情報ヲ度々受取リタカ。

答、私が陸軍部宣傳室官、職ヲ去ル迄、獨乙戰線、狀況ニシテ、情報傳來ノ毎日本統謀本部へ行キマシ。シテ若シソノ時、ヨリコロ下、班カラ我公へ、情報がアリタラソレを渡エテ呈上シタ。最初ハ、情報比較的稀、入ナシテシタ後、ナシハ、概々毎週二、三回受取リマシ。

問、シテ情報何使フシカ。

答、コノ情報、私ニ暗号機械ア伯林ノオカウエーバー宣部傳達ニ居テシ。

問、アタク度々ソノ情報ア伯林ニ傳達シタカ。

答、コノ情報、受取ル件、傳達ニ居テシ。最初比較的稀、後テ、彼々頻繁ル者ニ重要情報ハ大使館、電信室經由テセリテシ。

問、アタク自身ハ滿洲ニ居テシカ。

答、ハ。

問、アタクハ何回満洲に行キテシカ。

答、三回、第一回、一九三八年十二月から六月迄ノ半、大体二箇月満洲へ行キテシ。第二回、一九三九年五月から六月中極短

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期間行キシテ、常三四月（一九四一年二月廿三日）満洲へ行キシテ。
之ノルが在満陸軍試官、兼て居テ、満洲國政府様

移行夕時、總計數日間、于シ。

問、關東軍、兵數、知ニスカ。

答、父、知ニス。

問、ドコカラアタハ之ヲ知ニスカ。

答、一部、日本參謀本部カラテス。其外獨乙通信員、リハ
ルド、少佐カラテス。餘々ハ三人カラ、關東軍師團教導
予正確、資料、該師團亦番號、得テ之。往滿獨乙公
使館カラ、關東軍、兵數、ツヨニ或、資料ヲ収取リテ。

問、一九四一年初迄、二十多、第三回満洲訪問、夕時、關東軍兵
力ト、トウ見積、シテカ。

答、約二十三乃至三十個日本師團。

問、アナシ、言フハ、師團、教導テスカ。ソニ共二十三乃至三十個師團
ヲ組織、シテ、十分、丁寧隊、教導入カ。

答、日本人、二、三萬十教、日本師團が満洲、在ル、言フ子居
ヌガ、師團、三、一万人ト、シテ、二、三万人ト、シタカ、和ハカリセシ。

問、アタク観察テ、獨ソ戰、如テ、獨乙、關東軍、増加シテ
カ、ソニ反対減カシタカド、トス。

答、有ニ、關係、於テ、關東軍、人員、工、又、教練、三、五、兵
全建設上、又、防衛施設建設上、強化セマシ。

No. 10 問、何所カラアタク所ニシテ、資料が入りスカ。

答、吾々、之等資料、在長春、獨乙公使館カラ、収取リテ
シテ、外、自身日本參謀本部將校、就中、カントリナ佐

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カラ情報入るやうか？外から日本新兵が支那へ送り
ナチ満洲（送ラシタ系）を知らず居て。満洲カラ未タ獨
乙公満洲に向日本、運送船二隻ワント詰シテ居て。
日本カラ朝鮮及満洲へ、鐵道旅客輸送ハ數回中止セ
ラシコメツ一時ハ昭一九一四年中獨ソ聯軍ノ作ツ多後、
トトキシタ。

問、九四一年夏ニ於ル北閏東軍、強化ニシテドン資糧
ガアタク附ニアリテスカ。アタク、一九四一年初ニ満洲
ニ二十五乃至三十個日本師團ガツワタト言ハシタガ、
ソシハ一九四一年夏迄ニ増ヘタノテスカ。

答、師團、數ハドモ者之ノ增ヘテハ居ナカツタ事テス。
然レバ當時在シテ居タル師團ハ強化セヒタ。ソ、外日
本軍ト並ニテ存在シテ居タル満洲軍ガシノ時迄ヨリ
王一層良ノ訓練セヒ又一層良ノ組織セヒテ居リ
コニク、右組織ニハ日本人精銳及下士官ガ當シテ
居マス。

問、右、時期ニ於ル北閏東軍、技術上、裝備、強
化ニシテアタクハ何カ知シテ居マスカ。

答、例ヘバ「カンドリ」少佐ハ「ヒトラ」カラ日本參謀
本部ニ贈ラシタ榴彈ハ立トニナ満洲戰場
ニ於テ使用サルベキナルト私ニ詰シテ居
マシタ。

問、ソシハドン榴彈ナカカ詳シテ居マサ。

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答、七八八年十二月、陸軍第一師団下野平ア様、久々大吉實徳
力ヲ有スル事務官十キ噸彈ガリニシテ。
問、ドント本事情アヒトヲ」がコ、砲彈、日本參謀本部
ニ贈ツタ、テシタカ。

答、二メートル中位トハルケリ、大將、第三參謀局カヲ一九四
三年春對艦線ヲ破ツタ船、東シテ東京へ到着シテ
之タ。ソシテ艦橋ナキ船獨り、見本ヒソノ設計圖及繪
圖トア特ニ木本ミシメ、二、砲彈ハ、ヒトテヨリ日本
天皇ヘ、贈物トシテ右兩人カヲ嚴肅ナヒトテ経
ニ日本參謀總長、渡セシムシタ。其後、二メートル、
メビチ、八日本ヲ、砲彈ヲ、ヒトテ一人、志摩庄入
ル目的、以テ參謀局ヨリ、日本將校ト共ニ特
別、軍資所ニ傳付居マシタ。

問、アタクハコトヲ何所カラ知リマシタカ。

答、コトハ陸軍武官トハメシト、會談日、松知
シテ次、會談、松山市、清居コシタ。外、又此宛
威化電報、時拂解讀、衣物自身之ヲ受取シタカ之
ヨリ示被、日本出張、目的が判明シマシタ。

問、アタクハ芬蘭陸軍武官カイラ大佐ヲ知リマスガ。

答、ハイ。

問、コ人、滿洲、於此行動ニシテ何を知リテスカ。

答、カイラ大佐ハ一九四二年秋關東軍、松井三應
ニテ滿洲へ旅行シマシタ。以ハ冬季、軍事行動、條件
、關東軍ニ知リセル事アリマシタ。

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問、何所カラヤハシルノトヨタニ、御軍事部隊
答、力士ラ大佐モ瀬洲ヘ旅泊不思議ノシテ也
軍事官方ハ御内ニ來タ御内ソトニ御軍事某
時ニア人八丁度ノコトツキ不許シテ居マシテ
答、力士ラ大佐モ瀬洲ヘ歸シ後會面シタ力
權カラコトニ御見テテ之シテ松川旅乙ヘ出發人也
遂ニア人八瀬洲ヨリ東京ヘ歸シテ居マシタ力
問、ラ松川丁度、會面シテ居ル力士知ル
ナスカ.
答、力士、旅行、御軍事ノ事人、御軍事也。松川
ナムガ不思議人情ハ自命、旅行、然則ニ瀬洲是
アリシテ各、軍事旅行者ト御内トテシテ良
今日亦軍事、該軍事ヲナシテ、指示ハ大日本
第一人物ナシテナリトテナシテ、一言ナシテ
問、ナリハ一九四三年一月百子ノ事外條、浙々
仕、後松川丁度、時、東條上會マシテ證
高シシタ、シテ會見シテナリ。松川下サ
答、松川一九四三年正月、松川東條、外國陸軍武
官及輔佐官全部ヲ相手シテ時、東條、事
務室、彼ノ間合、テ
問、東條ハ右會見、滿日本、ノ時御内計画ニ
シテ何力有シテナリ。
答、ナキ東條ハ、日本ハ其の領地域にて御了其、

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予、故其辭曰：「惟天子之使，可以不以告于上帝。」
上言以夕太白，以太白滅而後祭，猶祭太白也。
問：「還送船？」
答：「送船者，送之於水也。」
問：「軍事中，日食亦可解否？」
答：「何為廢解？日食當解。」

答：「人對國家體制之不能了解，原因在於他不能出社會。

問、ドコカラヤハ、ハノコトヲ知テスガ
答、独立海軍少将伊藤平蔵也、提督ガラシ又二九
四三年一月中船ガ封鎖シテ鐵シテ船、ツツ船
ヲ破エヘ行ツサガリテ

問、運送船（何より最初）は、テノ船
（日本）の「アマツ」（アマツ）と

答：伊制船（江戸口才水道）は鐵船（アーチカル）

十七錫一年也足茶六百石當知其事也

同、河野アカシ、湯足茶ヲ贈、致スルヲ

賜予一湯及茶。新嘉坡年會上之文字

本圖書之序言，由圖書館之總編輯，即為該圖書之譯者。

本詩主以寫景，但景中含情，故可謂之“寓情于景”也。

人言不虛也。(周易經)

老撈記

龍虎門之少林寺傳人，餘象昇，號一齋，餘象昇，號一齋，

大清 同治六年正月

1922) (1922) (1922) (1922)

1996-1997

Doc. 3/45

證書

余左記署名「不」バ尔斯ル?「」、「日本主要戦
争犯罪人事件」関眞實下^シ證言^ヲ與^ル、義
務^ヲ負^ムべし右付極東國際軍事裁判所^所檢
察部次長^{ロセント}大佐^{二對}テ^{シテ}本證書^ヲ
提出^{スルモ}テアリス。

余^ニ虚偽^ノ證言^ヲ與^ルト^ニ對^シハ^{シテ}「社會主義
聯邦」^{ガエ}上共和国刑法第^{九十五}條^依刑事上[、]
責任^ヲ自分^ニ負^{ハサル}ハ^キ旨[、]注意^ヲ與^ヒテ居^ス。
(アリ)「不」バ尔斯ルフ)

一九四七年九月十二日

證言受理人

極東國際軍事裁判所^所檢察部次長

大佐^{ロセント}

通譯大尉^{ケラモウ}

No. 15

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私、左記署名、婦人通譯大尉エリーガンと、日本
主要戦争犯罪人事件、閣下、オーバーヒュストン、アーヴィング
證言ヲ正確ニ翻譯スル、義務負フ。右付極東
國際軍事裁判所、聯檢察部次長、ロゼンブリト
大佐、對于該三本證言ヲ提出スルモノアリマス。
私、知テ居テガラ虚偽、通譯ヲスニトニ對シテハ、
社會主義刑罰、宣上共和国刑法第九十九條依
て、刑事上、責任ヲ自今貰ハサルベキ旨、注意與
テ居リマス。(エリーガンモア)

一九四七年九月十二日

證言受理入

極東國際軍事裁判所、聯檢察部次長
大佐 ロゼンブリト

10. 1.6

1945.3.14.5

證言

松左記者名：唐人達記者：王一凡
日本主要
戰爭犯罪人事件三項大法：主犯不外此三件。證
言：據譯正官記錄及我所證：王一凡三件極
東國際軍事裁判所：輔審察部次長：口口口口口
大佑：對于該二不證言：舉出三件如下：
私、口口口唐人達正官記錄：十八年十一月十八日
三十、社會主義時期：少共之大隊團員約九十九條
（依）前事：上：貴任：司令：王一凡（即王達音）與
（即王達音）

（二）二七

一九四七年三月十一日

證言：唐人達

極東國際軍事裁判所：輔審察部次長

大佑：口口口口口

1947